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abstract: this paper analyses corporate risk in family businesses in conjunction with general-
ized economic adversity. Using data from Portuguese family-controlled firms for the period of time 
between 1999 and 2010, we focus on the possibility of asymmetrical corporate risk effects between 
periods of stability and economic adversity. overall, the results suggest that the evidence concern-
ing the family firms’ risk is sensitive to the different types of risk considered. Comparing family busi-
nesses with their counterparts, we find evidence that the former have lower levels of operational 
risk and are more indebted. the results indicate that the systematic risk is negatively related to age 
and positively related to size, the former relationship being stronger for family firms and the latter 
for non-family firms than for their counterparts. the evidence supports the hypothesis that risk for 
family controlled firms is less positively related to the proportion of independent directors on the 
board than non-family controlled firms, suggesting that founders are concerned about the survival 
of their firms. Finally, the results show that crises affect the operational risk in family businesses, 
suggesting that family firm managers are more reluctant to assume risk in periods of crisis. this 
paper offers some insights on the literature concerning family firms. to our knowledge, this is the 
first study to analyse corporate risk in the context of family firms. in addition, it examines corporate 
risk in combination with generalized economic adversity.
Keywords: Corporate risk, Family Firms, Crisis, Panel data.
introduction
existing literature suggests that family shareholders, with large equity 
stakes and executive representation, are common to public traded firms 
worldwide. la Porta, lopez-de-silanes, and shleifer (1999) analyzed a 
sample of 27 countries, finding evidence that about 50% of firms were 
family controlled firms. Faccio and lang (2002) found that more than 60% 
of listed firms in France, italy, and Germany were family businesses. sraer 
and thesmar (2007) analyzed the listed French firms, concluding that more 
than 60% of the firms were managed by founding families. although Us-
based studies document relatively lower percentage values for family busi-
nesses, anderson and Reeb (2003) and villalonga and amit (2006) found 
a percentage of 35 and 37, respectively.
Regardless of recent research on corporate finance in the context of family 
firms (dividends, debt and board structure, etc.), much research is still re-
quired. in addition, there is a gap in the research concerning corporate risk 
in the perspective of family businesses.
in this context, we investigated corporate risk and its relationship with firm 
specific variables in the context of family firms, exploring also the firms’ risk 
under steady and adverse economic conditions, using a sample of 58 Portu-
guese listed firms on euronext lisbon for the 1999-2010 period. thirty-five 
riesgo corporatiVo en empresas Familiares bajo la crisis 
económica 
resUmen: este artículo analiza el riesgo corporativo en empresas fami-
liares en yuxtaposición con la adversidad económica generalizada. Usando 
información de empresas familiares de Portugal para el período entre 1999 
y 2010, nos enfocamos en la posibilidad de efectos asimétricos de riesgo 
corporativo entre períodos de estabilidad y de adversidad económica. en 
general, los resultados sugieren que la evidencia concerniente al riesgo de 
las empresas familiares es sensible a los diferentes tipos de riesgos que se 
consideren. al comparar las empresas familiares con sus contrapartes, en-
contramos evidencia de que las primeras tienen niveles menores de riesgo 
operativo y tienen mayores deudas. los resultados indican que el riesgo 
sistemático está negativamente relacionado con la edad y positivamente 
relacionado con el tamaño; la primera relación es más fuerte para las em-
presas familiares y la segunda para las no familiares que para sus contra-
partes. la evidencia apoya la hipótesis de que el riesgo empresarial de las 
empresas controladas por una familia está menos relacionado positiva-
mente con la proporción de directores independientes en la junta que las 
empresas no familiares, lo que sugiere que a los fundadores les preocupa 
la supervivencia de su empresa. Finalmente, los resultados muestran que la 
crisis afecta el riesgo operativo en empresas familiares, lo que sugiere que 
los gerentes de las empresas familiares son más reacios a tomar riesgos 
en períodos de crisis. este artículo ofrece algunas nociones presentes en 
la literatura sobre empresas familiares. Hasta donde sabemos, este es el 
primer estudio en analizar el riesgo corporativo en el contexto de empresas 
familiares. adicionalmente, examina el riesgo corporativo en combinación 
con la adversidad económica generalizada. 
palabras claVe: Riesgo corporativo, empresas familiares, crisis, datos 
de panel.
le risQUe corporatiF dans les entreprises Familiales dans 
la crise ÉconomiQUe
rÉsUmÉ : Cet article analyse le risque corporatif dans les entreprises fami-
liales en juxtaposition avec l’adversité économique généralisée. Utilisant 
l’information d’entreprises familiales du Portugal pour la période 1999–
2010, nous nous concentrons sur la possibilité d’effets asymétriques de 
risque corporatif entre les périodes de stabilité et d’adversité économique. 
en général, les résultats suggèrent que le risque des entreprises familiales 
est fonction des types de risque considérés. Une comparaison des entre-
prises familiales avec leurs interlocuteurs montre que les premières ont un 
moindre niveau de risque opératoire et davantage de dettes. les résultats 
indiquent que le risque systématique est négativement lié à l’âge et posi-
tivement en relation avec la taille ; la première relation est plus forte pour 
les entreprises familiales et la seconde plus forte pour les non-familiales 
que pour les interlocuteurs. L’évidence appuie l’hypothèse que le risque 
entrepreneurial des entreprises contrôlées par une famille est moins lié po-
sitivement avec la proportion de directeurs indépendants dans le conseil 
d’administration que les entreprises non familiales, ce qui laisse penser 
que les fondateurs sont préoccupés par la survie de leur entreprise. enfin, 
les résultats montrent que la crise affecte le risque opératoire des entre-
prises familiales, ce qui suggère que les gérants des entreprises familiales 
sont plus réticents à prendre des risques en période de crise. Cet article 
apporte quelques notions présentes dans les publications sur les entre-
prises familiales. Mais, autant que l’on sache, c’est la première étude qui 
analyse le risque corporatif dans le contexte des entreprises familiales. en 
outre, elle considère le risque corporatif en liaison avec l’adversité écono-
mique généralisée.
mots-clÉs : Risque corporatif ; entreprises familiales ; crise ; données 
de panel. 
risco corporatiVo em empresas Familiares sob a crise 
econômica 
resUmo: este artigo analisa o risco corporativo em empresas familiares 
em justaposição com a adversidade econômica generalizada. Usando in-
formação de empresas familiares de Portugal para o período entre 1999 
e 2010, nos centramos na possibilidade de efeitos assimétricos de risco 
corporativo entre períodos de estabilidade e de adversidade econômica. 
Em geral, os resultados sugerem que a evidência concernente ao risco das 
empresas familiares é sensível aos diferentes tipos de riscos que forem con-
siderados. Ao comparar as empresas familiares com as suas congêneres, 
encontramos evidência de que as primeiras têm menores níveis de risco 
operativo e têm mais dívidas. Os resultados indicam que o risco sistemá-
tico está negativamente relacionado com a idade e positivamente relacio-
nado com o tamanho; a primeira relação é mais forte para as empresas 
familiares e a segunda para as não familiares, do que para as suas con-
gêneres. A evidência apoia a hipótese de que o risco empresarial das em-
presas controladas por uma família está menos relacionado positivamente 
com a proporção de diretores independentes na diretoria do que as em-
presas não familiares, o que sugere que os fundadores se preocupam com 
a sobrevivência da sua empresa. Finalmente, os resultados mostram que 
a crise afeta o risco operativo em empresas familiares, o que sugere que 
os gerentes das empresas familiares são mais relutantes a tomarem riscos 
em períodos de crise. este artigo oferece algumas noções presentes na li-
teratura sobre empresas familiares. até onde sabemos, este é o primeiro 
estudo que analisa o risco corporativo no contexto de empresas familiares. 
adicionalmente, examina o risco corporativo em combinação com a adver-
sidade econômica generalizada. 
palaVras-cHaVe: risco corporativo, empresas familiares, crise, dados 
de painel. 
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firms were family-controlled (about 60% of the firms) and 
the remaining 23 were non-family controlled firms.
this study contributes to the literature on family business 
in three main ways. the first is by exploring corporate risk 
in the context of family businesses. to our knowledge, this 
is the first study to analyze corporate risk in the context 
of family firms. this study offers an empirical attempt to 
isolate variables of potential significance in this regard. 
Previous studies focused only on financial risk related to 
the capital financing structure (anderson, mansi, & Reeb, 
2003; Romano, tanewski, & smyrnios, 2000) or on entre-
preneurial risk (Zahra, 2005), ignoring other types of risk. 
The second contribution is exploring the firms’ risk under 
both steady and adverse economic conditions, in order to 
test whether family controlled firms are sensitive to eco-
nomic crises. Finally, this is the first study to analyze the 
risk of family-controlled firms in Portugal. We believe the 
Portuguese example is of interest for two main reasons. 
smith (2008) argued that there may be differences be-
tween family and non-family firms because of their cor-
porate environment and this country tends to exhibit 
concentrated ownership and family control. Faccio and 
lang (2002) found evidence that family firms constitute 
60.34% of firms sampled in Portugal and that in about 
50% of the family-controlled firms, the controlling owner 
is in management. moreover, Portugal is a continental eu-
ropean country, of which the history, capital market, and 
firm characteristics largely differ from english-speaking 
countries, where most studies on family firms have been 
conducted. the results obtained in the Usa may not apply 
to companies from other countries whose goals and strate-
gies are different (Zahra, 2005). 
Overall, the results indicate that the family firms’ risk is 
sensitive to the different types of risk considered. We found 
evidence that family firms have lower levels of operational 
risk and are more indebted than non-family firms. in addi-
tion, their managers are more reluctant to assume risk in 
periods of crisis.
the remainder of this paper is organized as follows. sec-
tion 1 reviews the related literature and presents the for-
mulated hypotheses. section 2 describes the methodology 
and data. section 3 presents the empirical results. Finally, 
section 4 concludes the paper.
literature review and Hypotheses
meyer and Zucker (1989) argued that family firms suffer 
from strategic inertia and become risk averse.
Usually, families wish to pass the firm on to subsequent 
generations, favoring their own children and other family 
members (Zahra, 2005). Consequently, they place more 
value on the survival of the firm than wealth maximiza-
tion that other firms would seek (James, 1999). once sur-
vival becomes a priority, taking on excessive risk should 
not be one of the family’s objectives. Indeed, Storey (1994) 
stated that family businesses tend to be averse to risk. 
anderson et al. (2003) and schmid, ampenberger, Kas-
erer, and achleitner (2008) argued that family firms hold 
poorly diversified portfolios, having strong incentives to re-
duce firm risk and cash flow variability. naldi, nordqvist, 
sjöberg, and Wiklund (2007) draw a sample of swedish 
firms, finding that even if family firms do take risks while 
engaged in entrepreneurial activities, they take risk to a 
lesser extent than non-family firms. this provides empir-
ical support to the assumption that family firms tend to be 
more conservative and risk averse in their strategy making 
(Carney, 2005; schulze, lubatkin, & dino, 2002).
these observations suggest the following hypothesis:
H1: Family controlled firms present lower levels of risk than 
non-family controlled firms. 
However, maug (1998) emphasized that founding families 
often have highly undiversified investment, which may be 
affected adversely by the firm’s idiosyncratic risk, leading 
a family firm to take excessive risks. indeed, Khaemasunun 
(2004) found that family firms are riskier beta, indicating 
the non-diversifiable nature of their assets.
Gómez-mejía, Haynes, núñez-nickel, Jacobson, and moy-
ano-Fuentes (2007) analyzed the spanish market for the 
period between 1944 and 1998, concluding that family 
firms may be risk willing and risk averse at the same time. 
according the authors, non-family firms performing below 
target engage in projects with greater outcome variance 
(venturing risk) to avoid continued financial losses, and 
family firms might be willing to accept below-target perfor-
mance and a higher probability of failure (a performance 
hazard) to avoid socio emotional losses. this contrasts ear-
lier literature, which has proposed that as a result of highly 
concentrated undiversified assets, family firms are more 
risk averse (anderson et al., 2003; schmid et al., 2008).
masulis (1988) suggested that managers prefer to have 
less leverage than their counterparts in order to reduce 
the risk of their undiversified investment in the com-
pany. mishra and mcConaughy (1999) concluded that the 
founding family’s aversion to the risk of a loss of control 
motivates the use of less debt.
the risk adverse characteristics of family firms may imply 
less leverage (Zhou, 2012). Family firms have incentives to 
reduce risk, and higher levels of debt increase financial risk. 
Consequently, the risk of bankruptcy and loss of control 
j o u r n a l
r e v i s t a
innovar
63rev.  innovar vol.  24,  núm. 53,  Julio-septiembre 2014
also increase. then, comparing family controlled firms with 
non-family firms, the former are less likely to have higher 
levels of debt (mishra & mcConaughy, 1999; storey, 1994), 
which leads to the second testable hypothesis:
H2: Family controlled firms present lower debt levels than 
non-family controlled firms.
the empirical results are not consensual. 
according to Xin-Ping, Zhen-song, and ming-Gui (2006), 
the desire to retain control and reduce risk has opposing ef-
fects on leverage decisions. on the one hand, the desire to 
concentrate voting power motivates families to use more 
debt. on the other, the desire to reduce risk motivates fam-
ilies to use less debt financing. González, Guzmán, Pombo, 
and trujillo (2011) analyzed a sample of 523 Colombian 
firms for the 1996-2006 period, concluding that risk aver-
sion pushes firms toward lower debt levels, but the need to 
finance growth and the risk of losing control make family 
firms prefer higher debt levels and a higher risk aversion 
for family directors, because blockholders’ risk aversion im-
plies less indebtedness for the firm.
sonnenfeld and spence (1989), Gallo and vilaseca (1996) 
and mishra and mcConaughy (1999) found that family 
controlled firms use less debt. Gallo and vilaseca (1996) 
interpret this result as proof for controlled risk aversion in 
family firms. anderson et al. (2003) show that american 
family firms tend to have lower debt cost, because of the 
long-term horizon typical of this type of business and man-
agement’s concern for reputation.
However, Wiwattanakantang (1999), based on a thai 
sample, showed that family firms have significantly more 
debt than non-family firms, arguing that family ownership 
helps to reduce the agency cost of debt. 
Pindado and torre (2008) analyzed a sample of spanish 
listed firms for the period between 1990 and 1999, finding 
that family firms are less concerned with financial risk, but 
more concerned with maintaining their control over the 
firm than their counterparts. in addition, setia-atmaja, 
tanewski, and skully (2009) and setia-atmaja (2010) 
found evidence that family controlled firms employ higher 
debt levels, compared to non-family firms, concluding 
that family firms use debt as a substitute for independent 
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directors. the authors suggest that family firms do not 
expropriate minority or outside shareholders, but might 
adopt higher debt levels in order to improve monitoring. 
Céspedes, González, and molina (2010) and González et 
al. (2011) stated that firms tend to prefer debt to equity 
when losing control is an issue.
according to the finance assumption that profitability 
and risk are positively associated, we expect a positive 
relationship between performance and risk. indeed, the 
positive risk/return relation is a fundamental concept in 
finance theory. 
Conventional decision theory is considered to be a trade-
off between risk and the expected return (e.g., lintner, 
1965; mossin, 1966; sharpe, 1964), as defined in the Cap-
ital asset Pricing model (CaPm). However, some existing 
literature (e.g., Chen, Hexter, & Hu, 1993; Gallo, tapies & 
Cappuyns, 2004) reported diverging findings on the fi-
nancial performance of family businesses. thus, the per-
formance differences between family and nonfamily firms 
need to be interpreted carefully. 
Considering the family controlled firms risk aversion 
(storey, 1994), we expect that the risk and, consequently, 
the profitability of family firms to be lower than the one 
of non-family firms. this leads to the following hypothesis:
H3: Family controlled firms’ risk is less positively related to 
profitability than non-family controlled firms.
However, Wiseman and Catanach (1997) find arguments 
and results of positive and negative associations between 
risk taking and performance in the literature. in their study, 
they found that risk taking has positive and negative effects 
on performance, depending on the contexts. the alignment 
of interest between the firm and the family should en-
courage the exploration of innovative ideas that stimulates 
growth and improves performance (Zahra, 2005).
although Rauch, Wiklund, lumpkin, and Frese (2009) and 
sraer and thesmar (2007) found that the risk-taking di-
mension is positively related to performance, findings by 
naldi et al. (2007) and nunes, viveiros, and serrasqueiro 
(2012) suggest that risk taking in family firms is negatively 
related to perceived performance. However, naldi et al. 
(2007) do not consider systematic risk. 
the number of years a firm operates in the market is a sign 
of its survival (Rodríguez-Rodríguez, 2006). analyzing a 
sample of Portuguese smes, nunes et al. (2012) concluded 
that age negatively influences the firms’ business risk. 
We expect that firm age is associated with firm risk, with 
younger companies presenting higher levels of risk. on this 
basis, and based on the assumption that family firms are 
more adverse to risk, we formulated hypothesis four:
H4: Family controlled firms’ risk is more negatively related 
to age than non-family controlled firms.
Family firms are likely to handle risk differently than other 
types of firms, partly because management and ownership 
are not separated (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983) and partly 
because of the family nature of ownership and manage-
ment (e.g., Zahra, 2005).
several authors stated that firm size is essential to increase 
firms’ levels of profitability (Gschwandtner, 2005; Hard-
wick, 1997; Wyn, 1998). According to the risk/return rela-
tionship, we expect that the higher the firms’ profitability, 
the higher the systematic risk. the pecking order approach 
(myers, 1984; myers & majluf, 1984) argues that compa-
nies follow a hierarchical sequence in the selection of their 
funding sources in order to minimize the costs of financing. 
according to Rajan and Zingales (1995), companies with 
high levels of earnings have low levels of debt capital be-
cause they are able to use internal financing, not needing 
to rely on external resources. Considering the family con-
trolled firms risk aversion, we expect the size of family firms 
to be less (more) relevant for increasing (decreasing) risk, 
compared to the case of non-family firms. in this context, it 
is expected that the larger the firms, the lower the need for 
external borrowing, reducing the financial risk.
in this context, we formulate two related hypotheses:
H5a: Family controlled firms’ systematic risk is less positively 
related to size than non-family controlled firms.
H5b: Family controlled firms’ financial risk is more nega-
tively related to size than non-family controlled firms.
Beatty and Zajac (1994) and denis, denis, and sarin 
(1997) suggested that managers become risk averse as 
their ownership in the firm increases, so, there are reasons 
to believe that risk avoidance is stronger in family firms 
than in non-family firms.
villalonga and amit (2006), adams, almeida, and Ferreira 
(2009) and Zhou (2012) find a positive relationship be-
tween the presence of the founder as Ceo of the family 
business or as the Chairman of the board and the firms’ 
profitability. insofar as corporate risk, founders are often 
concerned about the survival of their firms and protecting 
their legacy for future generations (Zahra, 2005). this 
idea suggests that the higher the independent directors, 
the higher the risk level assumed. Given the expectation 
that family firms tend to have lower levels of risk than non-
family controlled firms, we formulate the sixth hypothesis:
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H6: Family controlled firms’ risk is less positively related to 
the proportion of independent directors on the board than 
non-family controlled firms.
However, Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen and meck-
ling (1976) suggested that as ownership increases, a 
greater alignment between the owner and the firm is 
achieved, which may encourage the exploration of innova-
tive ideas that stimulate growth and improve performance, 
leading to higher levels of risk.
in periods of recession, the volatility of share prices is 
higher (veronesi, 1999). moreover, investors tend to be ir-
rational and to overreact to bad market conditions (Glode, 
Hollifield, Kacperczyk, & Kogan, 2010). in the context of 
the agency theory, it is well known that managers have 
the incentive to take excessive risky projects when their 
firm is close to bankruptcy because they lose nothing from 
the downside failure and get the upside gain of the excess 
risk. non-family firm managers are myopic and have more 
incentive to take on risky projects to boost current earn-
ings (anderson & Reeb, 2003). according to Zhou (2012), 
in times of crisis, this situation is highly likely to happen. 
in this context, it is expected that family businesses are 
not as affected by this attitude as their counterpart firms. 
Based on the arguments above, we formulate the last 
hypothesis:
H7: Family controlled firms’ risk is less positively related to 
crisis than non-family controlled firms.
methodology and data
methodology
to apply our methodology, we need to distinguish between 
family firms (FF) and non-family firms (nFF). 
Because of the significant number of distinct definitions 
for FF in the literature (e.g., litz, 1995; Chua, Chrisman, 
& sharma, 1999; sharma, Chrisman & Chua, 1997), 
there is a lack of a widely accepted definition of FF (Ben-
nedsen & nielsen, 2010). in addition, some researchers 
concluded that the evidence concerning FF is sensitive to 
their different definitions (allouche, amann, Jaussaud, & 
Kurashina, 2008; maury 2006; miller, le Breton-miller, 
lester, & Cannella, 2007; Westhead & Cowling, 1998).
We follow la Porta, lopez-de-silanes, shleifer, and vishny 
(2000) and setia-atmaja et al. (2009), defining FF as 
those firms in which the founding family or family member 
control 20% or more equity, and are involved in the top 
management of the firm. the classification of FF and nFF 
was corroborated in the firm’s annual report. 
Because we wanted to examine the risk of FF, our depen-
dent variable is risk (RisK). We consider three kinds of RisK: 
systematic, operational and financial. 
to analyze systematic risk, we considered the beta mea-
sure (Beta), obtained though the CaPm:
R  - R  =  +  (R - R ) + i,t f,t i i m,t f,t i,tα β ε  
(1)
where: 
Ri,t = return on share i in period t;
Rft = risk free return in period t;
ai = abnormal return from CaPm model;
ai = systematic risk (beta);
Rmt = market return in period t;
ei = error term.
to analyze operational risk, we consider the standard devi-
ation (calculated over the past three years) of operating in-
come before depreciation to annual sales (oidBs) (mishra 
& mcConaughy, 1999). 
Finally, financial risk is measured by the level of financial 
leverage (lFl), calculated as the operating income scaled 
by the income before taxes.
in which concerns the independent variables, we con-
sidered the firms’ debt (DEBT), operational performance 
(oRoa), age (aGe), size (Fs), the board independence 
(BoaRd) and the market crisis (CRisis).
the deBt is the ratio of debt to total assets. a positive re-
lationship was expected between debt and financial risk.
as in Zhou (2012), we measured performance as the oper-
ating return on assets (oRoa), calculated as the operating 
earnings divided by total assets. We used oRoa because 
it is unaffected by the changes in capital structure, not in-
cluding firms’ financial earnings, which determines the cor-
porate tax base. Usually, profitability is related with firms’ 
economic risk (Rodríguez-Rodríguez, 2006). according to 
financial assumptions, we expected a positive relationship 
between performance and risk.
the number of years a firm operates in the market is a sign 
of its survival. We expected the firms’ age to be associated 
with firms’ risk, with younger companies presenting more 
risk. thus, we expect a negative sign for this coefficient. 
aGe was measured as the natural logarithm of the differ-
ence between incorporation year and a fiscal year.
Following anderson et al. (2003), we measured Fs as the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets of a 
firm. We expected a positive (negative) relationship be-
tween Fs and systematic (financial) risk.
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We analyzed the effect of board independence on the risk. 
according to anderson and Reeb (2004) and setia-atmaja 
(2010), independent directors are the individuals whose only 
business relationship to the firm is their directorship, identi-
fied in firms’ annual reports. BOARD was measured as the 
proportion of independent directors on the board. there 
should be a positive relationship between BoaRd and RisK.
We considered a dummy variable in order to identify the 
market crisis, which is one if a fiscal year is considering a 
year of financial recession, and zero otherwise. Considering 
distinctly the periods of financial boom and years of reces-
sion allowed us to analyze whether the family firms’ risk 
differs according to the market conditions. the variable 
CRisis took the value one for the 2008, 2009 and 2010 
years, and zero otherwise.
as control variables, we considered the cost of debt 
(Costd) and the weight of fixed operating costs (FoC). 
Costd was calculated as the interest expenses scaled by 
debt. We expected a positive relationship between Costd 
and firms’ financial risk. Anderson et al. (2003) results indi-
cate that FF experience a lower cost of debt financing. the 
FoC was calculated as the weight of fixed operating costs 
to the total of operating costs. We expected a positive re-
lationship between the FOC and the firms’ operational risk.
to analyze the relationship between RisK and the indepen-
dent variables, we employed the following regression model:
RISK i,t = + + + +  DEBT  OROA   AGE
             
1 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,tα β β β
β4 i,t 5 i,t 6 t,i
7 i,t
 FS  BOARD  CRISIS
              COSTD
+ + +β β
β + + +
+
β β
β ε
8 i,t 9 i,t
10 t i,t
 FOC   INDUSTRY
              YEAR  
(2)
the suffix i,t indicates that variables were considered for 
firm i during year t. ei,t is the error term.
the dependent variable assumed the different kinds of risk 
(systematic, operational and financial), of which the vari-
ables were already explained above. 
We included industry dummy variables in order to consider 
any variation in the dependent variable due to industry dif-
ferences. anderson and Reeb (2003), villalonga and amit 
(2006) and Zhou (2012) show that FF are not symmetri-
cally distributed in every industry. Finally, we considered 
year dummy variables to remove any secular effects among 
the independent variable. 
We employed a panel data methodology, since the com-
bination of a time series with a cross-section of n firms 
requires this methodology in order to adequately express 
the non-observable heterogeneity of the individuals (Bal-
tagi, 1995). We used the pooled ordinary least squares 
(ols), the fixed effects model (Fem), with all regressors 
uncorrelated with individual effects, and the random ef-
fects model (Rem), with all regressors correlated with in-
dividual effects. subsequently, we used the F-statistic and 
the Hausman (1978) test to choose the most appropriate 
model. We present the standard errors corrected for het-
eroscedasticity and covariance (White, 1980).
data
the sample consisted of an unbalanced panel data, corre-
sponding to Portuguese non-financial listed FF and nFF on 
the euronext lisbon, covering the period from 1999 to 2010. 
data were obtained from saBi, a private database provided 
by Bureau van dijk, and complemented with some addi-
tional information collected on the firms’ annual reports.
table 1 reports the number of firms and observations re-
lated to FF and nFF samples.
table 1. number of Firms and observations, divided by 
Family and non-Family Firms
Firms % observations %
Family firms 35 60.3 377 64.7
non-family firms 23 39.7 206 35.3
58 100 583 100
Source: Author’s own.
the sample is constituted by 58 firms, corresponding 
to 583 observations. We classified 35 firms as FF, corre-
sponding to 377 observations and 23 firms as nFF (206 
observations). FF constituted about 60% of the global 
sample, consistent with the percentage found by Faccio 
and lang (2002) for Portugal (60.34%). the evidence 
that almost 65% of the observations are related to FF is 
consistent with the evidence that family shareholders are 
common in public traded firms’ worldwide (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003; Claessens, djankov, & lang, 2000; Faccio & 
lang, 2002; Holderness, 2009; villalonga & amit, 2006).
results
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the study’s 
variables, including the mean, median, standard deviation, 
and maximum and minimum values, as well as the differ-
ences in mean variables between FF and nFF.
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table 2. descriptive statistics
FF nFF mean
t
mean median minimum maximum sd mean median minimum maximum sd differences
Beta 0.864 0.870 0.060 1.640 0.433 0.669 0.660 0.010 1.430 0.384 0.196 5.615 ***
oidBs 0.546 0.266 0.001 6.428 0.762 0.966 0.490 0.005 8.963 1.359 -0.420 -4.094 ***
lFl 1.823 1.117 -36.037 44.660 6.037 1.131 1.024 -32.783 30.431 4.866 0.692 1.504
deBt 0.715 0.728 0.007 2.287 0.224 0.672 0.693 0.046 1.630 0.270 0.043 1.936 *
oRoa 0.082 0.042 -0.536 1.692 0.248 0.048 0.031 -0.449 1.153 0.206 0.033 1.726 *
aGe 3.372 3.497 0.000 5.094 0.812 2.929 3.238 0.000 4.263 0.949 0.443 5.670 ***
Fs 19.583 19.704 12.506 22.837 1.987 19.255 18.642 15.490 24.424 2.363 0.328 1.693 *
BoaRd 0.392 0.333 0.000 0.857 0.200 0.508 0.400 0.124 1.000 0.270 -0.116 -5.411 ***
Costd 0.029 0.017 0.000 0.406 0.048 0.017 0.009 0.000 0.087 0.018 0.012 4.329 ***
FoC 1.774 2.263 -34.690 39.475 7.004 0.647 0.861 -40.168 33.592 6.854 1.127 1.883 *
* significantly different from zero at the 10% level; *** significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Source: Author’s own.
allouche et al. (2008) and Zhou (2012), it is consistent 
with the evidence of Khaemasunun (2004), Xin-Ping et 
al. (2006), Pindado and torre (2008), setia-atmaja et al. 
(2009) and setia-atmaja (2010). maybe the evidence that 
FF are more dependent on lenders than nFF might be ex-
plained by the use of debt to improve monitoring. in ad-
dition, older business owners tend to present lower levels 
of preference for equity (Romano et al., 2000), and, in our 
sample, FF are indeed older. alternatively, as FF are bigger, 
they can more easily obtain debt. it can also suggest that 
family firms are less concerned with financial risk, since 
their cost of debt is higher, but more concerned with main-
taining their control over the firm than their counterparts 
(Pindado & torre, 2008). Finally, FF might use debt as a 
substitute for independent directors (setia-atmaja et al., 
2009; setia-atmaja, 2010).
Higher levels of debt result in higher financing costs,, 
which can explain the fact that FF have a higher value 
for the cost of capital (a mean of 2.9% and 1.7%, respec-
tively). this should lead to higher levels of financial risk. 
indeed, FF present a higher value for the financial risk vari-
able. However, the difference is not statistically significant.
Curiously, the evidence that FF present more fixed oper-
ating costs is not consistent with the evidence that FF 
present lower levels of operational risk. However, the mean 
difference is only statistically significant at 10%.
in contrast with the results of schmid et al. (2008), FF are 
both older and larger.
in what concerns the oRoa measure, our results are in line 
with other studies that found evidence that FF outperform 
nFF (allouche et al., 2008; andersen & Reeb, 2003; Gnan 
In what concerns the firms’ risk, we can see that FF are dis-
tinct from nFF in terms of the systematic and the opera-
tional risk. although FF present higher levels of systematic 
risk, they have lower levels of operational risk.
the evidence that FF present higher levels of systematic 
risk (a mean beta of 0.864) than nFF (mean of 0.669) is in 
accordance with the results of maug (1998) and Khaema-
sunun (2004), who found that family firms are riskier beta, 
suggesting the non-diversifiable of the asset.
the lower levels of FF operational risk (a mean of 0.546 
against 0.966 for nFF) is consistent with prior theoretical 
studies (meyer & Zucker, 1989; storey, 1994) as well as 
the empirical evidence that family businesses tend to be 
averse to risk (anderson et al., 2003; Carney, 2005; naldi 
et al., 2007; schulze et al., 2002; schmid et al., 2008).
Given the risk results, we found evidence for the hypoth-
esis that FF present lower levels of risk than nFF (H1), but 
only for the operational risk. in addition, our results sug-
gest that the evidence concerning the family firms’ risk is 
sensitive to the different types of risk considered.
insofar as independent variables, FF differ from nFF in 
several firm characteristics. FF are more indebted, pre-
senting a higher cost of debt, and more fixed operating 
costs, are older and larger, have a lower proportion of 
independent directors on the board, and present higher 
levels of profitability.
Contrary to the expected, FF use more debt than nFF (a 
mean of 71.5% and 67.2%, respectively). thus, the second 
hypothesis is not supported (H2). although this result is 
contrary to the assumptions of storey (1994) and mishra 
and mcConaughy (1999), and the evidence provided by 
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& montemerlo, 2001; Poutziouris, sitorus, & Chittenden, 
2002; scholes, Wilson, Wright, & noke, 2012; sraer & 
thesmar, 2007). one possible reason for this may be the 
greater alignment between the owner and the firm as own-
ership increases, which may, in turn, improve performance 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & meckling, 1976). 
the mean proportion of independent directors is significantly 
lower for FF (39.2%) than for nFF (50.8%), and this result is 
consistent with the perspective that family members domi-
nate the board of directors (anderson & Reeb, 2004; setia-
atmaja, 2010) and that family shareholders are common in 
public traded firms (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & lang, 
2002; Holderness, 2009; villalonga & amit, 2006;). 
table 3 reports the Pearson correlations among the inde-
pendent variables for FF (Panel a) and nFF (Panel B).
table 3. pearson correlation matrix
 panel a: Family Firms
debt oroa age Fs board costd Foc
deBt 1
oRoa -0.191 1
aGe 0.188 0.082 1
Fs 0.113 0.044 -0.175 1
BoaRd -0.118 -0.334 0.176 -0.188 1
Costd -0.456 0.014 -0.098 -0.249 0.234 1
FoC -0.079 0.016 -0.031 0.110 -0.018 -0.038 1
 panel b: non-family Firms
deBt oRoa aGe Fs BoaRd Costd FoC
deBt 1
oRoa -0.024 1
aGe -0.252 0.352 1
Fs 0.257 0.042 -0.331 1
BoaRd -0.054 -0.379 -0.293 -0.274 1
Costd -0.001 -0.056 0.042 0.237 -0.032 1
FoC 0.042 0.100 0.057 0.161 -0.073 0.038 1
Source: Author’s own.
For FF, the higher level of correlation (in absolute terms) 
is between Costd and deBt (-0.456), showing that the 
higher the debt, the lower the cost of debt. this in an in-
dication that FF have financing capability, obtaining debt 
with low costs, suggesting no risk of distress.
For nFF, the higher correlation coefficients are between 
Fs and deBt (0.257) and between BoaRd and oRoa 
(-0.379). the correlation between Fs and deBt suggests 
that large nFF tend to have higher debt ratios, which is in 
accordance with the results of Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
this result is consistent with the trade-off theory, which 
notes that large companies are less exposed to costs of fi-
nancial distress and would expect to borrow more. Finally, 
nFF with higher levels of independent directors on the 
board tend to have lower levels of profitability.
overall, all the coefficients are low (below 0.46). Conse-
quently, it does not appear to be sufficiently large to cause 
concern about multicollinearity problems. 
table 4 reports the regression (2) results for FF (Panel a) 
and nFF (Panel B), considering the three measures of risk 
(Beta, oidBs and lFl). We present the best model results 
for each of the regressions1.
We start with the analysis of the FF results (Panel a). Con-
sidering the Beta dependent variable (model 1), we can 
see that the variables that explain the systematic risk are 
the deBt, oRoa, aGe, Fs and Costd, all of them statisti-
cally significant at 1% level.
As expected, the leverage is positively related to firms’ sys-
tematic risk. Contrary to the expected, the results show 
a negative relationship between oRoa and Beta, sug-
gesting that the better the performance, the lower the risk, 
which is consistent with the results of nunes et al. (2012) 
and somewhat in accordance with the ones of naldi et al. 
(2007), who found that family firms take on risks, but with 
negative implications for their performance. this evidence 
suggests that FF expect the firm to stay within the family 
over generations (James, 1999) and let key business deci-
sions be influenced by the family (Chua et al., 1999). ac-
cording to the expected relationship, the results indicate 
that the younger and the larger the FF, the higher the 
Beta. the results on aGe suggest that older companies 
are often unwilling to change (sathe, 2003). the positive 
relationship between systematic risk and size is consistent 
with the association predicted in hypothesis H5a. Finally, 
the evidence shows that the higher the Costd, the higher 
the systematic risk. 
Considering model (2), the results show that the opera-
tional risk is influenced only by CRisis. in periods of crisis, 
this type of risk is higher, as expected, suggesting higher 
levels of earnings volatility.
Finally, model (3) suggests that financial risk is positively 
related to oRoa.
overall, the regression model fits better for the nFF sample 
(Panel B). With the exception of model (3), the R2 are higher 
for nFF models. 
1 For simplicity reasons, we report only the results for the best mo-
del. However, the other outputs are available from authors upon 
request.
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table 4. regression results for FF and nFF
panel a: FF
dependent 
variable
(1) beta - ols (2) oidbs - ols (3) lFl - ols
 coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
Constant -0.3778 -1.429 0.4108 0.344 7.9665 0.831
deBt 0.3367 3.173 *** 0.1791 0.373 0.9419 0.245
oRoa -0.4770 -5.422 *** 0.2030 0.511 34.8799 10.929 ***
aGe -0.1423 -5.530 *** 0.1761 1.514 -0.0170 -0.018
Fs 0.0762 7.069 *** -0.0139 -0.285 -0.4364 -1.116
BoaRd 0.1030 0.950 -0.6651 -1.358 0.6390 0.163
CRisis -0.1068 -1.086 1.3452 3.025 *** 0.8414 0.236
Costd 2.8623 5.972 *** -0.6405 -0.296 -2.7341 -0.157
FoC -0.0006 -1.469 -0.0002 -0.081 0.0049 0.304
industry dummy yes yes yes
year dummy yes yes yes
n 377 377 377
adjusted R2 0.330 0.082 0.326
F-test 0.530 0.560 1.187
Hausman test 16.255 7.100  36.680 **
** significantly different from zero at the 5% level; *** significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Source: Author’s own.
panel b: nFF
dependent variable (1) beta - ols (2) oidbs - Fem (3) lFl - ols
 coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
Constant -1.691 -5.419 *** 6.1715 2.761 *** 2.6733 0.151
deBt -0.0836 -0.946 -0.0349 -0.051 14.1640 2.816 ***
oRoa -0.2285 -1.880 * -0.5524 -0.622 46.6305 6.743 ***
aGe -0.0285 -0.981 -0.3669 -1.652 -0.9184 -0.555
Fs 0.1156 10.071 *** -0.2571 -2.966 *** -0.7777 -1.190
BoaRd 0.3851 4.106 *** 2.7901 3.789 *** 1.1158 0.209
CRisis 0.0853 0.795 -0.0749 -0.174 6.1192 1.001
Costd -5.6747 -4.016 *** -12.5920 -1.240 -6.8224 -0.781
FoC 0.0001 0.312 -0.0002 -0.067 0.0066 0.356
industry dummy yes yes
year dummy yes yes
n 206 206 206
adjusted R2 0.486 0.377 0.316
F-test 0.355  2.401 *** 0.998
Hausman test 9.457  66.664 *** 26.171
* significantly different from zero at the 1% level; *** significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Source: Author’s own.
Considering model (1), we found a positive relationship 
between Fs and BoaRd and the systematic risk, and a 
negative relationship between oRoa and Costd and the 
systematic risk, which suggest that the larger the FF and 
the higher the proportion of independent directors on the 
board, the higher the Beta. However, the higher the prof-
itability and the cost of debt, the lower the systematic risk. 
the statistical significant coefficients present the same 
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sign as in the FF sample, with the exception of the Costd. 
the positive relationship between systematic risk and Fs is 
consistent with the association predicted in hypothesis H5a 
(model 1) and the assumption that firm size is important 
to increase the profitability of firms (Gschwandtner, 2005; 
Hardwick, 1997; Wyn, 1998).
insofar as model (2), the coefficient on Fs is statistically 
significant and negative and the coefficient on BoaRd is 
positive and statistically significant. the coefficient on Fs 
suggests that larger companies might resist change and in-
novation (sathe, 2003). the positive signal on BoaRd is as 
expected, being in line with the assumption that founders 
are concerned with the survival of their firms and pro-
tecting their legacy for future generations (James, 1999; 
Zahra, 2005).
model (3) results, as expected, suggest that the higher the 
debt ratio and the profitability, the higher the financial 
risk. the first relation is consistent with corporate finance 
theory assumptions (e.g., myers, 1984) and the second 
one with the relationship between risk and performance 
(lintner, 1965; mossin, 1966; sharpe, 1964).
Finally, we compared the FF (Panel a) with the nFF (Panel 
B) regression results.
For both the FF and nFF samples, the best model is the 
one where the dependent variables are the systematic risk 
(model 1). in this model, we found some evidence of in-
dustry effect.
We found no evidence that FF risk is less positively re-
lated to profitability than nFF, finding no support for H3. 
in what concerns the Beta, the results indicate that FF risk 
is more negatively related to age than nFF. Consequently, 
we found evidence for H4, with respect to systematic risk. 
We found evidence that FF systematic risk is less positively 
related to size than nFF. However, the results do not indi-
cate that FF financial risk is more negatively related to size 
than nFF. Consequently, our results support H5a, but do 
not support H5B. For models (1) and (2), FF risk appears to 
be less positively related to the proportion of independent 
directors on the board than nFF, which is consistent with 
H6. this evidence suggests that risk avoidance is stronger 
for FF than for nFF (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; denis, denis, 
& sarin, 1997). Finally, we found no evidence supporting 
the hypothesis that FF risk is less positively related to crisis 
than nFF (H7). 
the evidence obtained in table 4 (Panel a) shows that 
CRisis affects the operational risk in FF. in this context, 
and for robustness reasons, we decided to split the sample 
of FF in two sub-periods: before the crisis (1999-2007) and 
during the crisis (2008-2010), in order to analyze whether 
the independent variables in operational risk differ be-
tween expansion and recession periods.
table 5 shows the results of the regression (2), without con-
sidering the CRisis dummy variable and considering the 
oidBs measure of risk for the two distinct periods.
table 5. regression results for FF before and during the 
crisis period
dependent 
variable
oidbs - ols
 before crisis during crisis
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
Constant 0.7431 1.032 -2.1665 -0.402
deBt 0.1165 0.344 -0.2475 -0.163
oRoa 0.5537 2.312 ** -1.4365 -0.766
aGe 0.0754 1.080 0.8042 1.461
Fs -0.0229 -0.776 0.1100 0.502
BoaRd 0.1059 0.343 -3.4894 -1.852 *
Costd -1.9148 -1.428 7.5796 0.745
FoC -0.0006 -0.345 -0.0012 -0.254
industry dummy yes yes
year dummy yes yes
n 291 86
adjusted R2 0.117 0.110
F-test 0.425 0.823
Hausman test 12.660 9.676
* significantly different from zero at the 1% level; ** significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level.
Source: Author’s own.
Before the crisis, the operational risk is positively influ-
enced by profitability, which is in accordance with the fi-
nancial assumptions, as well as the results of sraer and 
thesmar (2007) and Rauch et al. (2009). it suggests that 
in expansion periods, FF are more likely to assume risk with 
perspectives of higher returns. during crisis, the results 
show that the higher the independent directors the lower 
the risk, suggesting that managers are more reluctant to 
assume risk in periods of crisis.
conclusion
this paper investigates firm risk in the context of Portu-
guese listed family-controlled firms, using an unbalanced 
panel data for the 1999-2010 period and focusing on the 
possibility of asymmetrical corporate risk effects between 
periods of stability and economic adversity.
the results suggest that the evidence concerning the 
family firms’ risk is sensitive to the different types of 
risk considered.
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overall, we found evidence that family firms have lower 
levels of operational risk than non-family firms. in addi-
tion, the results suggest that managers of family firms are 
more reluctant to assume risk in periods of crisis. this evi-
dence suggests that family firms tend to be more conser-
vative and risk averse than non-family firms, and that risk 
avoidance is stronger for crisis periods. therefore it may 
have real consequences for the allocation of corporate in-
vestment capital between family and non-family firms, ac-
cording to the risk aversion of investors.
the results indicate that the systematic risk is negatively 
related to age, suggesting that younger companies present 
higher risk, which is consistent with the life cycle of firms, 
the relationship being stronger for family firms than for 
their counterparts. moreover, we found evidence that 
family firms’ systematic risk is positively related to size, the 
relationship being stronger for non-family firms than for 
the family businesses. 
Finally, the evidence supports the hypothesis that the 
higher the proportion of independent directors on the 
board, the higher the systematic and operational risks, 
the relationship being less positive in the family controlled 
firms. this evidence suggests that founders are more con-
cerned about the survival of their firms than with the 
finance principle of shareholder wealth maximization, pos-
sibly because of families wish to pass the firm to subse-
quent generations. For policy makers, the finding that firm 
risk is significantly influenced by board independence in 
both family and non-family firms, could serve to justify a 
decision insofar as the proportion of independent directors 
on board. 
although studying a Portuguese sample aids the contri-
bution made by our study, because it is a market that has 
not yet been explored in this context, it also represents 
a limitation of our work because of the small size of the 
sample, resulting from the small size of the Portuguese 
capital market.
the results suggest several avenues for future research. 
Given the verification that evidence concerning family 
firms’ studies is sensitive to the respective definition, there 
is a need to consider alternative definitions of family firms, 
analyzing whether the results differ according to the defi-
nition of family firm. the results suggest the need to ex-
plore the relationship between risk and profitability in 
family businesses. Finally, we would like to focus on behav-
ioural finance theory in order to explain the determinants 
of corporate risk in the context of family-controlled firms.
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